



# Named Data Networking (NDN) a quick overview

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Military Communications for the 21st Century

LAX Marriott, Los Angeles, CA


# NDN: a new way to build networks

- Why we need a new way
- What is the new way
- How this new way is inherently more secure & resilient than the existing TCP/IP network architecture

# TCP/IP : a revolution to communication (40 years ago)

- Telecom: setting up a circuit first
- From circuit to packet switching
  - “It was this need for *survivability of communications* that required plodding through new ground not previously explored.”  
– Paul Baran, 1977
- Packet switching: computers as switches
  - Enabling one to send data packets *without setting up a circuit first*
  - Enabled by technology advances

# TCP/IP: building a resilient network infrastructure




- Point-to-point datagram delivery
  - The same communication model as telecom
  - IP addresses identify network attachment points
- Communication through the infrastructure is orders of magnitude more resilient due to *dynamic routing*

40 years passed, technology  
advanced again (by a lot)

(IP-based Infrastructure communication succeeded beyond the wildest dreams)


- Today: (ad hoc) mobile wireless communications
  - Hand-held devices, drones, ships, aircrafts
  - Each may possess multiple interfaces
- Applications have changed too
- Mobiles and large number of IoT devices have made it increasingly difficult to achieve communication resiliency by shooting packets to specific IP addresses




<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oCZMoY3q2uM>

# What's the new way:

- IP delivers packets to hosts based on numeric IP addresses



- Named Data Networking fetches data by using application data object names



- Example data names
  - [www.nist.gov/document/ndn\\_agendav5docx](http://www.nist.gov/document/ndn_agendav5docx)
  - [www.youtube.com/watch?v=oCZMoY3q2uM](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oCZMoY3q2uM)
    - Large objects fragmented to multiple packets, each fragment uniquely named



# Networking by application named data

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

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# A conceptually simple change

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# NDN: two types of network layer packets

application data name

(may carry a few optional parameters)

Consumer requests data by sending  
**Interest packet**

application data name


a few pieces of metainfo

**data**

crypto signature

Producer binds name to content to  
create **Data packet**

# Named data enables securing data directly




The signature binds the name and content at data production time

# Named data enables host multihoming




- IP assigns address to each interface, switching between interfaces leads to address change
- Data name is independent from interface, can freely use any or all of the interfaces

# Named, secured data enables in-network caching



# Named data enables data muling at network-layer






# NDN's Stateful Forwarding Plane

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# NDN's node model



NFD module resides in every NDN node


<i>name prefix</i>	<i>next hop</i>
google.com	A, B
ucla.edu	B,C, D
ucla.edu/cs/lixia	A, B, D,

PIT breaks Interest looping, enable NDN to freely use multiple paths



# NDN Interest Forwarding

## NDN FORWARDING DAEMON




For each PIT entry:

Interest name	incoming Interface(s)	outgoing interface(s) sending time
.....		

May forward an interest packet out through one or more interfaces


# NDN Data Packet forwarding

## NDN FORWARDING DAEMON



Interest name	incoming Interface(s)	outgoing interface(s) sending time

# Forwarding Strategy



- Forwarding Strategy makes interest forwarding decisions by taking input from
  - FIB
  - measurement from Interest-data exchange (and any other local resource information)
  - Per-namespace forwarding policies

# Resilient data availability means

- Host multihoming
- Pervasive in-network storage
- Delay/disruption tolerance
- Multipath forwarding
- Multicast delivery
  
- All the above lead to *redundant* means to get data
- Enabled by making data itself identifiable independent from containers or channels



# NDN's Security Support


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# How we secure communication today

- Encrypting point-to-point channels
  - TLS
  - QUIC
- Running over IP, requiring synchronized connectivity between the two communicating ends
- Battlefields need support for delay/disruption tolerant communications



# NDN builds security into (data) packets

- Independent from data containers or communication channels
- Data packets are sealed at production
- Interest packets can be authenticated as well

# NDN enables end-to-end data security



Data producers sign



Data consumers verify

## End-to-end data authenticity

independent from intermediate communication channels, middle boxes, intermittent connectivity





Data producers sign



Data consumers verify

- Requiring security bootstrapping: installing trust anchor(s) into all entities in an NDN network
- Requiring every data producing entity possess cryptographic key(s)
- Requiring efficient signing and verification for resource constrained devices

# Designing security building block into the narrow waist

Network security is conceptually simple:

- Data authenticity → Signing/verifying received data
  - NDN mandates data authentication
- Data confidentiality → Encrypting data
  - NDN supports name/attribute-based encryption
- Data availability → via redundancy
  - Making multiple copies
  - Trying multiple paths
  - Native properties of the forwarding plane

# The real security challenges

- Trust management
  - Today: through commercial certificate authority services
  - NDN's approach to trust management
    - Start with local trust anchors
      - UCLA as the trust anchor for all UCLA controlled business
    - Establish relations among trust anchors

Similar to "SDSI - A Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure"  
<https://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/sdsi10.html>
- Usability
  - Comprehensive trust policy configurations
  - Automated crypto key management

# Addressing crypto usability challenges

- Crypto keys and trust policies are all named, secured data
  - They can be fetched by anyone as needed
- Establish well known naming conventions
  - Enable one to construct the names for desired keys and policies
  - Facilitate the definition of security policies through defining the relations between the names of keys and their permitted actions on data (trust schema, see reference 3)
- Automating crypto key management
  - Certificate issuance
  - Automated key generation and distribution for content encryption/decryption (name-based access control, reference 4)
    - Developed solutions for attribute-based encryption

The above concepts will be illustrated in the chat and PLI apps

- One can communicate by requesting named data, *without needing network addresses*
- Fetching named data at network layer is
  - Demanded by new apps and network scenarios
  - enabled by technology advances
- Networking by app defined data names enables NDN
  - Securing data directly → remove dependency on intermediaries
  - Using semantic names of both data & keys to reason security policies, automate crypto management and operations
  - Increasing data availability via
    - host multihoming
    - Multipath forwarding
    - Multicast delivery
    - Pervasive in-network storage
    - Delay/disruption tolerance



NDN as a new Internet protocol architecture to meet the military communication challenges

1. [An Overview of Security Support in Named Data Networking](#), IEEE Communications Magazine, November 2018.
2. [Opportunities and Challenges for Named Data Networking to Increase the Agility of Military Coalitions](#)  
*Proceedings of Workshop on Distributed Analytics Infrastructure and Algorithms for Multi-Organization Federations (DAIS), 2017.*
3. [Schematizing Trust in Named Data Networking](#), ACM ICN 2015
4. [NAC: Automating Access Control via Named Data](#), IEEE MILCOM 2018
5. [The Story of ChronoShare, or How NDN Brought Distributed Secure File Sharing Back](#), IEEE MASS 2015 Workshop on Content Centric Networking

Backup slides



“Realizing a Virtual Private Network using Named Data Networking”,  
ACM ICN 2017

## Conclusions and Future Directions

**Raytheon**  
BBN Technologies

- Considering the classic IP VPN security question, applied to NDN, we provide evidence that:
  - A relatively straightforward NDN-in-NDN analogy provides all of the standard NDN benefits while gaining much of the needed security for VPNs
  - Most VPN security holes within NDN-in-NDN, resulting from IP and NDN differences, can be solved
  - Some security concerns are difficult, and often require a tradeoff between privacy and scalability
- Future directions:
  - Name obfuscation, balancing privacy and scalability
  - Detailed traffic analysis of NDN-in-NDN
  - Implement an NDN-in-NDN prototype